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ABSTRACT
The semiconductor industry is fully globalized and integrated cir-
cuits (ICs) are commonly defined, designed and fabricated in differ-
ent premises across the world. This reduces production costs, but
also exposes ICs to supply chain attacks, where insiders introduce
malicious circuitry into the final products. Additionally, despite
extensive post-fabrication testing, it is not uncommon for ICs with
subtle fabrication errors to make it into production systems. While
many systems may be able to tolerate a few byzantine components,
this is not the case for cryptographic hardware, storing and comput-
ing on confidential data. For this reason, many error and backdoor
detection techniques have been proposed over the years. So far
all attempts have been either quickly circumvented, or come with
unrealistically high manufacturing costs and complexity.
This paper proposes Myst, a practical high-assurance architec-
ture, that uses commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, and pro-
vides strong security guarantees, even in the presence of multi-
ple malicious or faulty components. The key idea is to combine
protective-redundancy with modern threshold cryptographic tech-
niques to build a system tolerant to hardware trojans and errors.
To evaluate our design, we build a Hardware Security Module that
provides the highest level of assurance possible with COTS compo-
nents. Specifically, we employ more than a hundred COTS secure
cryptocoprocessors, verified to FIPS140-2 Level 4 tamper-resistance
standards, and use them to realize high-confidentiality random
number generation, key derivation, public key decryption and sign-
ing. Our experiments show a reasonable computational overhead
(less than 1% for both Decryption and Signing) and an exponential
increase in backdoor-tolerance as more ICs are added.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many critical systems with high security needs rely on secure
cryptoprocessors to carry out sensitive security tasks (e.g., key gen-
eration and storage, legally binding digital signature, code signing)
and provide a protection layer against cyber-attacks and security
breaches. These systems are typically servers handling sensitive
data, banking infrastructure, military equipment and space sta-
tions. In most cases, secure cryptoprocessors come embedded into
Hardware Security Modules, Trusted Platform Modules and Cryp-
tographic Accelerators, which are assumed to be both secure and
reliable. This entails that errors in any of the Integrated Circuits
(ICs) would be devastating for the security of the final system. For
this reason, the design and fabrication of the underlying ICs must
abide f to high-quality specifications and standards. These ensure
that there are no intentional or unintentional errors in the circuits,
but more importantly ensure the integrity of the hardware supply
chain. [50].
Unfortunately, vendors are not always able to oversee all parts of
the supply chain [36, 58]. The constant reduction in transistor size
makes IC fabrication an expensive process, and IC designers often
outsource the fabrication task to overseas foundries to reduce their
costs [33, 44, 97]. This limits vendors to run only post-fabrication
tests to uncover potential defects. Those tests are very efficient
against common defects, but subtle errors are hard to uncover.
For instance, cryptoprocessors with defective RNG modules and
hardware cipher implementations have made it into production in
the past [30, 37].
Additionally, parts of the IC’s supply chain are left vulnera-
ble to attacks from malicious insiders [11, 61, 65, 82] and have a
higher probability of introducing unintentional errors in the final
product. In several documented real-world cases, contained errors,
backdoors or trojan horses. For instance, recently an exploitable
vulnerability was discovered on Intel processors that utilize Intel
Active Management Technology (AMT) [47], while vulnerable ICs
have been reported in military [57, 76] applications, networking
equipment [38, 48], and various other application [2, 54, 74, 75]. Fur-
thermore, the academic community has designed various types of
hardware trojans (HT), and backdoors that demonstrate the extent
of the problem and its mitigation difficulty [10, 17, 22, 52, 63, 89–91].
Due to the severity of these threats, there is a large body of
work on the mitigation of malicious circuitry. Existing works have
pursued two different directions: detection and prevention. De-
tection techniques aim to determine whether any HTs exist in a
given circuit [3, 77, 93, 95], while prevention techniques either
impede the introduction of HTs, or enhance the efficiency of HT
detection [27, 67, 86, 87, 92]. Unfortunately, both detection and pre-
vention techniques are brittle, as new threats are able to circumvent
them quickly [92]. For instance, analogmalicious hardware [96] was
able to evade known defenses, including split manufacturing, which
is considered one of the most promising and effective prevention
approaches. Furthermore, most prevention techniques come with a
high manufacturing cost for higher levels of security [18, 27, 92],
which contradicts the motives of fabrication outsourcing. To make
matters worse, vendors that use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
components are constrained to use only post-fabrication detec-
tion techniques, which further limits their mitigation toolchest. All
in all, backdoors being triggered by covert means and mitigation
countermeasures are in an arms race that seems favorable to the
attackers [92, 94].
In this paper, we propose Myst a new approach to the problem of
building trustworthy cryptographic hardware. Instead of attempt-
ing to detect or prevent hardware trojans and errors, we proposed
and provide evidence to support the hypothesis:
“We can build high-assurance cryptographic hardware from a set of un-
trusted components, as long as at least one of them is not compromised,
even if benign and malicious components are indistinguishable.”
Our key insight is that by combining established privacy en-
hancing technologies (PETs), with mature fault-tolerant system
architectures, we can distribute trust between multiple components
originating from non-crossing supply chains, thus reducing the
likelihood of compromises. To achieve this, we deploy distributed
cryptographic schemes on top of an N-variant system architec-
ture, and build a trusted platform that supports a wide-range of
commonly used cryptographic operations (e.g., random number
and key generation, decryption, signing). This design draws from
protective-redundancy and component diversification [26] and is
built on the assumption that multiple processing units and com-
munication controllers may be compromised by the same adver-
sary. However, unlike N-variant systems, instead of replicating the
computations on all processing units, Myst uses multi-party cryp-
tographic schemes to distribute the secrets so that the components
hold only shares of the secrets (and not the secrets themselves), at
all times. As long as one of the components remains honest, the
secret cannot be reconstructed or leaked. Moreover, we can tolerate
two or more non-colluding adversaries who have compromised
100% of the components.
Our proposed architecture is of particular interest for two distinct
categories of hardware vendors:
❖ Design houses that outsource the fabrication of their ICs.
❖ COTS vendors that rely on commercial components to build
their high-assurance hardware.
Understandably, design houses havemuch better control over the
IC fabrication and the supply chain, and this allows them to take full
advantage of our architecture. In particular, they can combine exist-
ing detection [7, 25, 66] and prevention techniques [24, 27, 67, 92]
with our proposed design, to reduce the likelihood of compromises
for individual components. On the other hand, COTS vendors have
less control as they have limited visibility in the fabrication process
and the supply chain. However, they can still mitigate risk by using
ICs from sources, known to run their own fabrication facilities.
To our knowledge this is the first work to use distributed crypto-
graphic protocols to architect hardware that is tolerant to multiple
components carrying trojans or errors. To summarize, this paper
makes the following contributions:
❖ Concept:We introduce backdoor-tolerance, where a system
can still preserve its security properties in the presence of
multiple compromised components.
❖ Design:We demonstrate how cryptographic schemes (§4)
can be combined with N-variant system architectures (§3),
to build high-assurance systems. Moreover, we introduce a
novel distributed signing scheme based on the Schnorr blind
signatures (§4.5).
❖ Implementation:We implement the proposed architecture
by building a custom board featuring 120 highly-tamper
resistant ICs, and realize secure variants of random number
and key generation, public key decryption and signing (§5).
❖ Optimizations:We implement a number of optimizations
to ensure the Myst architecture is competitive in terms of
performance compared to single ICs. Some optimizations
also concern embedded mathematical libraries which are of
independent interest.
❖ Evaluation:We evaluate the performance of Myst, and use
micro-benchmarks to assess the cost of all operations and
bottlenecks (§6).
Related works and their relation to Myst are discussed in Sec-
tion 7.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce backdoor-tolerance, and outline our
security assumptions for adversaries residing in the IC’s supply
chain.
2.1 Definition
A Backdoor-Tolerant system is able to ensure the confidentiality
of the secrets it stores, the integrity of its computations and its
availability, against an adversary with defined capabilities. Such
a system can prevent data leakages and protect the integrity of
the generated keys and random numbers. Note that the definition
makes no distinction between honest design or fabrication mistakes
and hardware trojans, and accounts only for the impact these errors
have on the security properties of the system.
2.2 Threat Model
We assume an adversary is able to incorporate errors (e.g., a hard-
ware trojan) in some ICs but not all of them. This is because, ICs are
manufactured in many different fabrication facilities and locations
by different vendors and the adversary is assumed not to be able to
breach all their supply chains. Malicious ICs aim to be as stealthy
as possible, and conceal their presence as best as possible, while be-
nign components may have hard to detect errors (e.g., intermittent
faults) that cannot be trivially uncovered by post-fabrication tests.
Hence, malicious and defective components are indistinguishable
from benign/non-faulty ones.
Figure 1: An overview of the Myst’s distributed architec-
ture, featuring all the integral components and communi-
cation buses. The gray area represents the cryptographic de-
vice, featuring several untrusted cryptoprocessors (ICs). As
shown, the trusted operator interacts with individual ICs,
while the host interacts with the device as a whole.
The adversary can gain access to the secrets stored in the mali-
cious ICs and may also breach the integrity of any cryptographic
function run by the IC (e.g., a broken random number generator).
Moreover, the adversary has full control over the communication
buses used to transfer data to and from the ICs. Hence, they are able
to exfiltrate any information on the bus and the channel controller,
and inject and drop messages to launch attacks. Additionally, they
are able to connect and issue commands to the ICs, and if a sys-
tem features more that one malicious ICs, the adversary is able to
orchestrate attacks using all of them (i.e., colluding ICs). We also
assume that the adversary may use any other side-channel that a
hardware Trojan has been programmed to emit on – such as RF [5],
acoustic [39] or optical [6] channels. Additionally, the adversary
can trigger malicious ICs to cease functioning (i.e., availability at-
tacks). We also make standard cryptographic assumptions about
the adversary being computationally bound.
Finally, we assume a software developer or device operator builds
and signs the applications to be run on the ICs. From our point of
view they are trusted to provide high-integrity software without
backdoors or other flaws. This integrity concern may be tackled
though standard high- integrity software development techniques,
such as security audits, public code repository trees, determinis-
tic builds, etc. The operator is also trusted to initialize the device
properly and choose ICs and define diverse quorums so that the
probability of compromises is minimized.
3 ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we introduce the Myst architecture (build and eval-
utation in § 5 and 6), which draws from fault-tolerant designs and
N-variant systems [26, 80]. The proposed design is based on the
thesis that given a diverse set of k ICs sourced from k untrusted sup-
pliers, a trusted system can be build, as long as at least one of them
is honest. Alternatively, our architecture can tolerate up to 100%
compromised or defective components, if not all of them collude
with each other. As illustrated in Figure 1, Myst has three types of
components: (1) a remote host, (2) an untrusted IC controller, and
(3) the processing ICs.
Processing ICs. The ICs form the core of Myst, as they are col-
lectively entrusted to perform high-integrity computations, and
provide secure storage space. The ICs are programmable processors
or microprocessors. They have enough persistent memory to store
keys and they feature a secure random number generator. Protec-
tion against physical tampering or side-channels is also desirable
in most cases and mandated by the industry standards and best
practices for cryptographic hardware. For this reason, our proto-
type (Section 5), comprises of components that verify to the a very
high level of tamper-resistance (i.e., FIPS140-2 Level 4), and feature
a reliable random number generator (i.e., FIPS140-2 Level 3). Each
implementation must feature two or more ICs, of which at least
one must be free of backdoors. We define this coalition of ICs, as a
quorum. The exact number of ICs in a quorum is determined by the
user depending on the degree of assurance she wants to achieve
(see also Subsection 3.2 and the Assessment Subsection 6).
IC controller. The controller enables communication between the
ICs, and makes Myst accessible to the outside world. It manages
the bus used by the processing ICs to communicate with each other
and the interface where user requests are delivered to. Specifically,
it enables:
❖ Unicast, IC-to-IC: an IC A sends instructions an IC B, and
receives the response.
❖ Broadcast, IC-to-ICs: an IC A broadcasts instructions to all
other ICs, and receive their responses.
❖ Unicast, Host-to-IC: a remote client send commands to a
specific IC, and receives the response.
❖ Broadcast, Host-to-ICs: a remote client broadcasts commands
to all ICs, and receive their responses.
The controller is also an IC and is also untrusted. For instance
it may drop, modify packets or forge new ones, in order to launch
attacks against the protocols executed. It may also collude with one
or more processing ICs.
Operator. The operator is responsible for setting up the system
and configuring it. In particular, they are responsible for sourcing
the ICs and making sure the quorums are as diverse as possible.
Moreover, the operator determines the size of the quorums, and
sets the security parameters of the cryptosystem (Section 4). They
are assumed to make a best effort to prevent compromises and may
also be the owner of the secrets stored in the device.
Remote Host. The remote host connects to Myst through the IC
controller; it issues high level commands and retrieves the results.
The remote host can be any kind of computer either in the local
network or in a remote one. In order for the commands to be exe-
cuted by the ICs, the host must provide proof of its authorization
to issue commands, usually by signing them with a public key as-
sociated with the user’s identity (e.g., certificate by a trusted CA).
Each command issued must include: 1) the requested operation, 2)
any input data, and 3) the host’s signature (see also Section 3.1).
We note that a corrupt host may use Myst to perform operations,
but cannot extract any secrets, or forge signatures (see also § 3.1).
Communication Channels. At the physical level, the ICs, the
controller, and the hosts are connected through buses and network
interfaces. Hence, all messages containing commands, as well as
their eventual responses are routed to and from the ICs through
untrusted buses. We assume that the adversary is able to eavesdrop
on these buses and tamper with their traffic (e.g., inject or modify
packets). To address this, we use established cryptographic mecha-
nisms to ensure integrity and confidentiality for transmitted data.
More specifically, all unicast and broadcast packets are signed using
the sender IC’s certificate, so that their origin and integrity can be
verified by recipients. Moreover, in cases where the confidentiality
of the transmitted data needs to be protected, encrypted end-to-end
channels are also established. Such encrypted channels should be
as lightweight as possible to minimize performance overhead, yet
able to guarantee both the confidentiality and the integrity of the
transmitted data.
3.1 Access Control Layer
Access Control (AC) is critical for all systems operating on confiden-
tial data. In Myst, AC determines which hosts can submit service
requests to the system, and which quorums they can interact with.
Despite the distributed architecture of Myst, we can simply repli-
cate established AC techniques on each IC. More specifically, each
IC is provided with the public keys of the hosts that are allowed to
have access to its shares and submit requests. Optionally, this list
may distinguish between hosts that have full access to the system,
and hosts that may only perform a subset of the operations. Once a
request is received, the IC verifies the signature of the host against
this public key list. The list can be provided either when setting up
Myst, or when storing a secret or generating a key.
We note that it is up to the operator to decide the parameters of
each quorum (i.e., size k , ICs participating), and provide the AC lists
to the ICs. This is a critical procedure, as if one of the hosts turns out
to be compromised, the quorum can be misused in order to either
decrypt confidential ciphertexts or sign bogus statements. However,
the secrets stored in the quorum will remain safe as there is no
way for the adversary to extract them, unless they use physical-
tampering (which our prototype (§5) is also resilient against). This
is also true in the case where one of the authorized hosts gets
compromised. For instance, a malware taking over a host can use
Myst to sign documents, but it cannot under any circumstances
extract any secrets.
3.2 Reliability Estimation
In the case of cryptographic hardware, in order for the operator
to decide on the threshold k and the quorum composition, an es-
timation of the likelihood of hardware errors is needed. For this
purpose we introduce k-tolerance, which given k foundries and
an independent error probability, computes the probability that a
quorum is secure.
Pr[secure] = 1 − Pr[error]k (1)
The quantification of the above parameters depends on the par-
ticular design and case, and as there is not commonly accepted way
of evaluation, it largely depends on the information and testing
capabilities each vendor has. For instance, hardware designers that
use split manufacturing [27, 67, 92] can estimate the probability of
a backdoored component using the k-security metric [46]. On the
other hand, COTS vendors cannot easily estimate the probability
of a compromised component, as they are not always aware of the
manufacturing technical details. Despite that, it is still possible for
them to achieve very high levels of error and backdoor-tolerance by
increasing the size of the quorums and sourcing ICs from distinct
facilities (i.e., minimizing the collusion likelihood). It should be
noted that as k grows the cost increases linearly, while the security
exponentially towards one.
4 SECURE DISTRIBUTED COMPUTATIONS
In this section, we introduce a set of protocols that leverage the
diversity of ICs in Myst to realize standard cryptographic opera-
tions manipulating sensitive keying material. More specifically, our
cryptosystem comprises of a key generation operation (§4.1), the
ElGamal encryption operation (§4.2), distributed ElGamal decryp-
tion (§4.3), and distributed signing based on Schnorr signatures
(§4.5) [34, 35]. These operations are realized using interactive cryp-
tographic protocols that rely on standard cryptographic assump-
tions. For operational purposes, we also introduce a key propaga-
tion protocol that enables secret sharing between non-overlapping
quorums (§4.6).
Prior to the execution of any protocols, the ICs must be initialized
with the domain parametersT = (p,a,b,G,n,h) of the elliptic curve
to be used, where p is a prime specifying the finite field Fp , a and b
are the curve coefficients,G is the base point of the curve, with order
n, andh is the curve’s cofactor. More details on the technical aspects
of the initialization procedure are provided in the provisioning
Section 6.4.
Distributed Key Pair Generation. The Distributed Key Pair Gen-
eration (DKPG) is a key building block for most other protocols.
In a nutshell, DKPG enables a quorum Q of k ICs to collectively
generate a random secret x , which is an element of a finite field and
a public value Yaдд = x ·G for a given public elliptic curve pointG .
At the end of the DKPG protocol, each player holds a share of the
secret x , denoted as xi and the public value Yaдд . All steps of the
protocol are illustrated in Figure 2, and explained in turn below.
The execution of the protocol is triggered when an authorized
host sends the corresponding instruction (❶). At the first step of
the protocol, each member of Q runs Algorithm 4.1 and generates
a triplet consisting of: 1) a share xi , which is a randomly sampled
element from Zn , 2) an elliptic curve point Yi , and 3) a commitment
to Yi denoted hi . (❷)
Algorithm 4.1: TripletGen: Generation of a pair and its com-
mitment.
Input :The domain parameters λ
Output :A key triplet (xi ,Yi ,hi )
1 xi ← Rand(λ)
2 Yi ← xi ·G
3 hi ← Hash(Yi )
4 return (xi ,Yi ,hi )
Upon the generation of the triplet, the members perform a pair-
wise exchange of their commitments (❸), by the end of which, they
all hold a set H = {h1,h2, ..,ht }. The commitment exchange ter-
minates when |Hq | = t ∀q ∈ Q . Another round of exchanges then
Figure 2: The interaction between the different participants
during the execution of the Distributed Key Pair Generation
(DKPG) protocol.
starts, this time for the shares of Yaдд (❹) Y = {Y1,Y2, ..,Yt }. The
commitment exchange round is of uttermost importance as it forces
the participants to commit to a share of Yaдд , before receiving the
shares of others. This prevents attacks where an adversary first
collects the shares of others, and then crafts its share so as to bias
the final pair, towards a secret key they know.
Algorithm 4.2: CommitVerify: ChecksYi , against their respec-
tive commitments.
Input : (Y ,H )
Output :Bool
1 for i ∈ {1, |Y |} do
2 if Hash(Yi ) , hi then
3 return False
4 return True
Once each member of the quorum receives k shares (i.e., |Y | = k),
it executes Algorithm 4.2 to verify the validity of Y ’s elements
against their commitments in H . (❺) If one or more commitments
fail the verification then the member infers that an error (either
intentional or unintentional) occurred and the protocol is termi-
nated. Otherwise, if all commitments are successfully verified, then
the member executes Algorithm 4.3 (❻) and returns the result to
the remote host (❼). Note that it is important to return Yaдд , as
well as the individual shares Yi , as this protects against integrity
attacks, where malicious ICs return a different share than the one
they committed to during the protocol [40, 62]. Moreover, since Yi
are shares of the public key, they are also assumed to be public, and
available to any untrusted party.
Algorithm 4.3: ShareAggr: Aggregates elements in a set of
shares (e.g., ECPoints, field elements).
Input :Set of shares Q
Output :The aggregate of the shares q
1 q ← 0
2 for qi ∈ Q do
3 q ← q + qi
4 return q
In the following sections, we rely on DKPG as a building block
of more complex operations.
4.1 Distributed Public Key Generation
The distributed key generation operation enables multiple ICs to
collectively generate a shared public and private key pair with
shares distributed between all participating ICs. This is important
in the presence of hardware trojans, as a single IC never gains
access to the full private key at any point, while the integrity and
secrecy of the pair is protected against maliciously crafted shares.
We opt for a scheme that offers the maximum level of confiden-
tiality (t-of-t, k = t ), and whose execution is identical to DKPG seen
in Figure 2. However, there are numerous protocols that allow for
different thresholds, such as Pedersen’s VSS scheme [40, 62, 79].
The importance of the security threshold is discussed in more detail
in Section 6.3.
Once a key pair has been generated, the remote host can encrypt
a plaintext using the public key Y , request the decryption of a
ciphertext, or ask for a plaintext to be signed. In the following
sections we will outline the protocols that realize these operations.
4.2 Encryption
For encryption, we use the Elliptic Curve ElGamal scheme [23, 34]
(Algorithm 4.4). This operation does not use the secret key, and
can be performed directly on the host, or remotely by any party
holding the public key, hence there is no need to perform it in a
distributed manner.
Algorithm 4.4: Encrypts a plaintext using the agreed common
public key.
Input :The domain parameters T , the plaintextm encoded
as an element of the group G, and the calculated
public key Yaдд
Output :The Elgamal ciphertext tuple, (C1, C2)
1 r ← Rand(T )
2 C1 ← r ·G
3 C2 ←m + r · Yaдд
4 return (C1, C2)
Figure 3: The interaction between the different ICs during
the execution of the distributed decryption protocol.
4.3 Decryption
One of the fundamental cryptographic operations involving a pri-
vate key is ciphertext decryption. In settings, where the key is held
by a single authority, the decryption process is straightforward, but
assumes that the hardware used to perform the decryption does
not leak the secret decryption key. Myst addresses this problem by
distributing the decryption process between k distinct processing
ICs that hold shares of the key (Figure 3).
The protocol runs as follows: Initially, the host broadcasts the
decryption instruction along with the part of the ciphertext C1 to
the processing ICs (❶). Upon reception, the ICs first verify that
the request is signed by an authorized user (❷), and then execute
Algorithm 4.5 to generate their decryption shares Ai (❸). Once the
shares are generated they are sent back to the host, signed by the
ICs and encrypted under the host’s public key (❹). Once the host
receives k decryption shares, executes Algorithm 4.6 to combine
them and retrieve the plaintext (❺).
Algorithm 4.5: DecShare: Returns the decryption share for a
given ciphertext.
Input :A part of the Elgamal ciphertext (C1) and the IC’s
private key of xi .
Output :The decryption share Ai , where i is the IC’s uid
1 Ai ← −xi ·C1
2 return Ai
It should be noted that during the decryption process, the plain-
text is not revealed to any other party except the host, and neither
the secret key nor its shares ever leave the honest ICs. An extension
to the above protocol can also prevent malicious ICs from returning
arbitrary decryption shares, by incorporating a non-interactive zero
knowledge proof [20] in the operation output.
Algorithm 4.6: AggrDec:Combines the decryption shares and
returns the plaintext for a given ciphertext.
Input :The Elgamal ciphertext C2 and the set of decryption
shares A.
Output :The plaintextm
1 D ← 0
2 for Ai ∈ A do
3 D ← D +Ai
4 m ← (C2 + D)
5 returnm
4.4 Random Number Generation
Another important application of secure hardware is the genera-
tion of a random fixed-length bit-strings in the presence of active
adversaries. The key property of such systems is that errors (e.g.,
a hardware backdoor), should not allow an adversary to bias the
generated bitstring.
The implementation of such an operation is straightforward.
The remote host submits a request for randomness to all actors par-
ticipating in the quorum. Subsequently, each actor independently
generates a random share bi , encrypts it with the public key of the
host, and signs the ciphertext with its private key. Once the host
receives all the shares, he combines them to retrieve the b and then
uses an one way function (e.g., SHA3-512 [16]) to convert it to a
fixed length string.
4.5 Signing
Apart from key generation, encryption and decryption, Myst also
supports distributed signing – an operation that potentially ma-
nipulates a long term signature key. Here we introduce a novel
multi-signature scheme, based on Schnorr signature [71].
A multi-signature scheme allows a group of signers to distribu-
tively compute a signature on a common message. There has been
a very long line of works on multi-signature schemes [13, 21, 53,
55, 56, 60] featuring several security properties (e.g. accountability,
subgroup-signing) and achieving various efficiency trade-offs. A
significant portion of work has been dedicated in reducing the trust
in the key generation process. However, this often involves the use
of expensive primitives or increases the interaction between parties
[21, 53, 55]. In our construction, we rely on Myst’s DKPG for the
key generation process.
Our multi-signature scheme is based on Schnorr signatures [71]
and has similarities with Bellare and Neven [13] construction. One
crucial difference between existing multi-signature schemes and
ours, is that we utilize a host intermediating between signers (i.e.,
ICs). This intermediating host allows us to eliminate any interaction
between the ICs and thus improve the efficiency of the construction.
To further minimise the interaction between the host and ICs we
adapt existing techniques used in proactive two-party signatures
[59] into the multi-signature context.
We let PRFs (j) be a pseudorandom function with key s , that
takes j as input and instantiates it as Hash(s | |j).
Initially, all k ICs cooperate to generate a public key y using
the distributed key generation operation (Section 4.1), and store
securely their own key share xi . Moreover, each IC generates a
Algorithm 4.7: SigShare: Returns the signature share of the
IC for a given plaintext and index j.
Input :The digest of the plaintext to be signed H (m), the
IC’s private key of xi and secret s , an index j , and the
aggregated random EC point Rj .
Output :The signature share tuple (σi j , ϵj )
1 ϵj ← Hash(Rj | |Hash(m)| |j)
2 ri j ← PRFs (j)
3 σi j ← ri j − xi · ϵj mod n
4 return (σi j , ϵj )
secret s for the PRF, and stores it securely. After these steps, the
signing protocol can be executed. The protocol comprises of two
phases: caching and signing.
In the caching phase (Figure 4), the host queries the ICs for
random group elements Ri j , where i is the id of the IC and j an
increasing request counter (❶). Once such a request is received,
the IC verifies that the host is authorized to submit such a request
and then applies the keyed pseudorandom function on the index j
to compute ri, j = PRFs (j) (❷). The IC then uses ri, j to generate a
group element (EC Point) Ri j = ri, j ·G (❸), which is then returned
to the host. Subsequently, the host uses Algorithm 4.3 to compute
the aggregate (Rj ) of the group elements (Algorithm 4.3) received
from the ICs for a particular j, and stores it for future use (❹). It
should be noted that the storage cost for Rj is negligible: for each
round the host stores only 65 Bytes or 129 Bytes depending on the
elliptic curve used (for Rj ) and the corresponding round index j.
This allows the host to run the caching phase multiple times in
parallel, and generate a list of random elements that can be later
used, thus speeding up the signing process.
The signing phase (Figure 5) starts with the host sending a Sign
request to all ICs (❶). Such a request includes the hash of the
plaintext Hash(m), the index of the round j , and the random group
element Rj corresponding to the round. Each IC then first verifies
that the host has the authorization to submit queries (❷) and that
the specific j has not been already used (❸). The latter check on j is
to prevent attacks that aim to either leak the private key or to allow
the adversary to craft new signatures from existing ones. If these
checks are successful, the IC executes Algorithm 4.7 and generates
its signature share (❹). The signature share (σi, j , ϵj ) is then sent to
the host (❺). Once the host has collected all the shares for the same
j, can use Algorithm 4.3 on all the σi, j to recover σj , obtaining the
aggregate signature (σj , ϵj ) (❻).
The recipient of ⟨(m, j), σ , ϵ⟩ can verify the validity of the signa-
ture by checking if ϵ = Hash(R | |Hash(m)| |j), where R = σ ·G+ϵ ·Y .
Security Analysis. The security of a multi-signature scheme re-
quires that if at least one of the signers behaves honestly, then it is
impossible to forge a multi-signature. In our context, the presence
of a single honest IC guarantees the signature cannot be forged
even in presence of a malicious host controlling all the remaining
ICs. The key generation process is a crucial step for the security of
multi-signature schemes due to the so called rogue-key attacks [13].
The latter enables an attacker to maliciously generate shares of
the public key in such a way that is possible for her to forge multi-
signatures. In Myst’s DKPG process, malicious ICs cannot subvert
Figure 4: The interaction between the different players dur-
ing the caching phase of the distributed signing protocol.
Figure 5: The figure illustrates the interaction between the
different players when signing.
the key generation process as long as at least one IC is not colluding
with the others, thus preventing rogue-key attacks. The security of
our multi-signature scheme is proved in Theorem 4.1 assuming the
hardness of on the one-more discrete logarithm problem [12]. We
refer to Appendix A for the security definitions of multi-signatures
and the proof of the following Theorem.
Theorem 4.1. If there exists a (qS ,qH , ϵ)-forger F for the multi-
signature scheme described in Figures 4 and 5 interacting inqS = O(1)
signature queries, making at most qH Hash queries and succeeding
with probability ϵ , then there exists an algorithm A that solves the
(qS + 1)-DL problem with probability at least
δ ≥ ϵ
2
q
qS+1
H
− neдl(λ)
4.6 Key Propagation
In cases where more than one quorum is available it is useful to
enable them all to handle requests for the same public key. This is
of particular importance for both the system’s scalability and its
availability, as we further discuss in Sections 6.2 and 6.4 respectively.
Once a quorum Q1 has generated its public key y, (Section 4.1)
the operator can specify another quorum Q2 that is to be loaded
with y. Each member qi ofQ1 then splits its secret xi in |Q2 | shares
and distributes them to the individual members ofQ2. To do that qi
follows the secret sharingmethod shown inAlgorithm 4.8. However,
any t-of-t secret sharing schemes proposed in the literature [19, 62,
73] would do.
Algorithm 4.8: SecretShare: Returns a vector of shares from a
secret.
Input :The domain parameters T , a secret s which is to be
shared, and the number of shares k .
Output :A vector of shares ®vs
1 for (i = 0 to k − 2) do
2 ®vs [i] ← Rand(T )
3 ®vs [k − 1] ← (s − ®vs [1] − ®vs [2] − ... − ®vs [k − 2])
4 return ®vs
Once each member of Q2 receives |Q1 | shares, which they then
combine to retrieve their share of the secret corresponding to y.
Each member ofQ2 can retrieve its share by summing the incoming
shares, modulo p (the prime provided in the domain parameters T ).
An additional benefit of such a scheme is that Q1 and Q2 may have
different sizes.
It should be also noted that a naive approach of having each
member of q1 send their share of x to a member of q2 is insecure, as
malicious members from q1 and q2 can then collude to reconstruct
the public key.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we provide the implementation details of our Myst
prototype. We first focus on the custom hardware we built, and
outline its different components and capabilities. Thereafter, we
discuss the development of the software for the untrusted ICs and
the details of the remote host.
Figure 6: Overview of Myst’s components.
5.1 Hardware Design & Implementation
For our Myst prototype, we designed our own custom circuit board,
which features 120 processing ICs (set to use 40 quorums of 3 smart-
cards from different manufacturers) interconnected with dedicated
buses with 1.2Mbps bandwidth.
Figure 7: Myst’s smartcard board supports 120 ICs (60 on
each side). Our configuration splits them in 40 quorums of
3 diverse ICs each.
The processing ICs are JavaCards (version 3.0.1), loaded with a
custom applet implementing the protocols outlined in Section 4.
JavaCards are an suitable platform as they provide good interop-
erability (i.e., applets are manufacturer-independent), which con-
tributes to IC-diversification and prevents lock-in to particular
vendors. Moreover, they also fulfill all the requirements listed in
Section 2: (1) they are tamper-resistant (FIPS140-2 Level 4, CC EAL4)
and can withstand attacks from adversaries with physical access
to them [68], (2) they feature secure (FIPS140-2 compliant) on-card
random number generators, (3) they offer cryptographic capabilities
(e.g., Elliptic curve addition, multiplication) through a dedicated
co-processor and (4) there are numerous independent fabrication
facilities (Section 6). In addition to these, they have secure and
persistent on-card storage space, ideal for storing key shares and
protocol parameters.
The host is implemented using a computer that runs a python
client application, which submits the user requests (e.g., Cipher-
text Decryption) to Myst using a RESTful API exposed by the de-
vice. The incoming requests are handled by a Spring server, which
parses them, converts them to a sequence of low-level instructions,
and then forwards these to the IC controller, through an 1Gbps
TCP/UDP interface. The ICs controller is a programmable Artix-7
FPGA that listens for incoming instructions and then routes them
to the processing IC, through separate physical connections. We
took special care that these buses offer a high bandwidth (over
400kbps), to prevent bottlenecks between controller and ICs even
under extreme load. Once the ICs return the results, the controller
communicates them back to the server, that subsequently forwards
them to the host.
5.2 Software
We implement the protocols of Section 4 and provide the necessary
methods for inter-component communication and system parame-
terization.
We develop and load the processing ICs with JavaCard applets
implementing methods for 1) Card Management, 2) Key Genera-
tion, 3) Decryption, and 4) Signing. Although JavaCard APIs since
version 2.2.2 specifies a BigNumber class, this class is either un-
supported by real cards or provides only too small internal type
length (typically at most 8 bytes). The only third-party BigInteger
library available (i.e., BigNat1) is unmaintained and lacked essential
operations. Moreover, low-level elliptic curve operations are only
1https://ovchip.cs.ru.nl/OV-chip_2.0
poorly supported by standard JavaCard API. The IC vendors often
offer own proprietary APIs which provides the required operations
(e.g., EC point addition) – but for the price of reduced portability.
This made the implementation of our cryptographic schemes more
complicated.
We extend BigNat to provide methods catering to our specific
needs. Additionally, we develop own EC operations library based
solely on public JavaCard API to support ICs where proprietary
API is not available or cannot be used. Our EC library provides
methods for EC point initialization, negation, addition, subtraction
and scalar multiplication, and has been released as an independent
project 2.
Note, that although vendor’s proprietary API limits the porta-
bility, it usually provides better performance and better protec-
tion against various side-channel attacks in comparison to custom
software-only implementations. For this reason, we structured the
IC applet code for easy incorporation of proprietary API with mini-
mal code changes. Our EC library is thus used only when no other
option is available for target IC.
Our current implementation is based on the NIST P-256 [1, 84]
curve that provides at least 128 bits of security. However, it can also
be trivially adapted for any other curve.
Optimizations. We optimize our JavaCard applet for speed and
to limit side-channel attacks. Although JavaCard applets are com-
piled with standard Java compiler, common Java implementation
patterns (e.g., frequent array reallocation due to resizing) are pro-
hibitively expensive on JavaCards. Therefore, we use the following
optimization techniques based on good practices and performance
measurements from real, non-simulated, smart cards [81]:
❖ We use hardware accelerated cryptographic methods from
JavaCard API instead of custom implementations interpreted
by JavaCard virtual machine where possible.
❖ We store the session data in the faster RAM-allocated arrays
instead of persistent, but slower EEPROM/Flash
❖ We use copy-free methods which minimize the move of
data in memory, and also utilize native methods provided
by JCSystem class for array manipulation like memory set,
copy and erase.
❖ We made sure to pre-allocate all cryptographic engines and
key objects during the applet installation. No further alloca-
tion during the rest of the applet lifetime is performed.
❖ Surplus cryptographic engines and key objects are used to
minimize the number of key scheduling and initialization
of engine with a particular key as these operations impose
non-trivial overhead [81].
❖ We refrain from using single long-running commands which
would cause other cards to wait for completion, thus increas-
ing the latency of the final operation.
Finally, we optimized two fundamental operations commonly
used in cryptographic protocols: 1) integer multiplication, and 2)
the modulo operation optimized for 32 byte-long EC coordinates.
This was necessary, as the straightforward implementation of these
two algorithms in JavaCard bytecode is both slow and potentially
vulnerable to side-channel timing attacks. Instead, we implemented
2https://OpenCryptoJC.org
both operations so as to use the native RSA engine and thus have
constant-time run-time.
The integer multiplication of a and b can be rewritten as
a · b = ((a + b)2 − a2 − b2)/2. The squaring operation (e.g., a2) can
be quickly computed using a pre-prepared raw RSA engine with
a public exponent equal to 2 and a modulus n, that is larger than
the sum of the lengths of both operands. On the other hand, the
integer modulo of two operands a (64 bytes long) and b (32 bytes
long) is not so straighforward. We exploit the fact that b is always
the order of the fixed point G in the P-256 Elliptic Curve [1, 84],
and transform a mod b = a − (((a · x) ≫ z) · x) where x and z val-
ues are pre-computed offline [42]. As a result, a modulo operation
can be transformed to two RSA operations, one shift (with z being
multiple of 8) and one subtraction. Note that we cannot directly use
RSA with a public exponent equal to 1 as operands are of different
length and also shorter than smallest RSA length available on the
card.
5.3 System States
Initially, the system is in an non-operational state, where the pro-
cessing ICs do not respond to user requests. To make it operational,
a secure initialization process has to be carried out. During the ini-
tialization the processing ICs and the other components described
in 3 are loaded with verified application packages, and the domain
parameters for the distributed protocols are set. Moreover, the ICs
are provided with their certificates that they will later use to sign
their packets and establish secure communication channels.
Once the initialization process has been completed, the system
switches to an operational state and is available to serve user re-
quests. Depending on the configuration, the systemmay be brought
back to an uninitialized state, in order to load new software or
change the protocol parameters. We further discuss the importance
of the initialization process in Section 6.4.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluateMyst by examining both its performance,
and its qualitative properties.
Experimental Setup. All evaluations were performed using the
setup illustrated in Figure 6. The host is a single machine with a
CentOS 7 OS (3.10.0 Linux kernel), featuring a 3.00GHz Intel(R) Core
i5-4590S CPU, 16GB of RAM, and uses a python client application to
submit service requests to Myst, through a 1Gbps Ethernet interface
(as described in Section 5). Upon reception, the server uses the
Java Spring framework [49] to parse them, and then forward the
instructions to the Artix-7 FPGA, which subsequently routes them
to the individual smart cards. In all experiments, we collect response-
time measurements from both the host and the Spring server. On
average the round-trip from the host to the server takes 5ms . For
accuracy, we use the host measurements in the rest of the section.
6.1 Performance Impact
This subsection evaluates the performance impact of Myst, and
compares its throughput and latency with that of a single-IC system.
Moreover, it examines the impact of our optimizations on the overall
performance of the system.
Figure 8: The average response time for each distributed op-
eration of the cryptosystem, in relation to the quorum (i.e.,
a coalition of multiple ICs) size.
Methodology. To better understand the overhead that the use of
a distributed architecture entails we run experiments that measure
the latency as the size of the protocol quorum grows. We first sub-
mit 1,000 requests for each cryptosystem operation (Section 4) in
one JavaCard and measure the response time. We then extend the
experiment to larger quorums with sizes ranging from 2 to 10, and
measure the latency in completing the same 1,000 operations. Si-
multaneously, to gain a more in-depth understanding of the impact
that each low-level instruction type has, we micro-benchmark the
response time for all intra-system communications.
Results. Figure 8 plots the average response time for performing
Key Generation, Decryption and Signing using IC quorums of dif-
ferent sizes. To begin with, Decryption is the fastest (119ms), since
it implements a single round protocol. Moreover, when we compare
the runtime between the single-IC run, and the runs with multiple
ICs, we observe that the latency is stable and the overhead remains
always smaller than 0.8%. Hence, we conclude that the Decryp-
tion time does not increase with the size of the quorum, due to
the ICs performing the decryption computations simultaneously.
This highlights that Decryption is only CPU bound, and the net-
work capacity of our prototype does not pose a bottleneck; and
demonstrates that Myst can essentially provide increased assur-
ance, with negligible impact on the decryption runtime. It should
be noted that, high-throughput decryption is of extreme impor-
tance in applications such as secure key derivation in mix-network
infrastructures [32] that heavily rely on decryption. Similarly, the
runtime for signing remains the constant (∼ 517ms) regardless
of the quorum size. This is because our multi-sig signing proto-
col does not require one-to-one interaction between the ICs. The
runtime difference between decryption and signing is mainly be-
cause of JavaCard API limitations. Specifically, we were forced to
perform some of the mathematical operations for signing in the
general purpose processor of the card, and not in the cryptographic
coprocessor. The caching phase of the signing protocol (takes on
average 169ms/operation) was performed offline for thousands of
Figure 9: Breakdown of the runtime for low-level instruc-
tions that comprise the key generation operation, in rela-
tion to the quorum size. The horizontal reference line repre-
sent the cost of using a single IC.
indices j and is not considered in the measurements, as it is ran
only occasionally.
As with signing and decryption, the runtime for random number
generation is also constant, as the protocol is single round and can
be executed in parallel.
On the other hand, Key Generation (DKPG) requires two phases
(commitment and revelation) and this adds significant latency. In
particular, as seen in Figure 8, each additional IC results in an
runtime increase of approximately 90ms. Figure 9 examines the
timings of low-level operations involved in the key generation
protocols. When quorums are small the cost of key generation
is dominated by the “INS_KEYGEN_INIT” operation that gener-
ates a secret share, and derives a public key (624ms). However,
as the IC quorums grow the operations related to exchanging
public keys (“INS_KEYGEN_STORE_PUBKEY”) and commitments
(“INS_KEYGEN_STORE_HASH”) become significant, and for a quo-
rum of 10 ICs, nearly doubles the cost of key generation. However,
for quorums of 3 the impact on runtime is merely 303ms, com-
pared to a single IC. Other low-level operations used in DKPG have
negligible cost, regardless of the quorum size.
6.2 Scalability & Extensibility
This section examines how the throughput of our prototype grows
as the more processing power (i.e., quorums) is added. The absence
of bottlenecks in the system is important to be able to provide
high-availability in production environments.
Methodology. To determine how efficiently our design scales
in practice, we run a series of experiments that measure Myst’s
throughput, for varying numbers of processing quorums. As de-
scribed in Section 5, our board supports up to 120 processing ICs
which can be divided into multiple quorums and serve requests
simultaneously. To benchmark the scalability of the system, on
each iteration of the experiment we submit 10,000 requests for each
Figure 10: The average system throughput in relation to the
number of quorums (k = 3) that serve requests simultane-
ously. The higher is better.
high-level operation supported by our cryptosystem, and measure
its throughput. However, this time we fix the quorum size k to 3,
and on each iteration we increase the number of quorums serving
the submitted requests by one, until we involve 40 quorums, which
is the maximum number of 3-IC quorums that our prototype can
support. For simplicity, we assign each processing IC to only one
quorum. However, it is also technically possible for an IC to partic-
ipate in more than one quorums, and store more than one secret
shares.
Results. Figure 10 illustrates the throughput of the Myst system (in
operations per second) as more of the ICs are used for processing
transactions. The maximum throughput of Myst was 315ops/sec for
Decryption and 77ops/sec for Signing, when using all 40 quorums.
We also observe that as the number of quorums increases, the
performance increases linearly, at a rate of ∼ 9 requests per second
per additional quorum for the Decryption operation, and ∼ 1.9
requests per second for Signing. This illustrates that the system is
CPU bound, and the communication fabric between ICs and the
host is not a bottleneck. Consequently, a system with our proposed
architecture can be easily tailored for different use cases to provide
the throughput needed in each of them. It should be also noted that
using a lower threshold k < t does not affect the performance of
the system. However, this may result in some ICs being idle longer.
For this purpose, it would be beneficial if ICs participated in more
than one quorum, thus minimizing their idle time.
6.3 Tolerance levels
Myst is tolerant against both fabrication-time and design-time at-
tacks (assuming independent foundries and design houses). Alterna-
tively, if there is only one design house, then Myst protects against
fabrication-time attacks only. In this section, we examine the rela-
tionship between the system parameters and the tolerance levels
provided depending on the attack type (Table 1). The reported toler-
ance levels are those provided by the schemes outlined in Section 4,
Parameters Leakage Denial-of-Service IC Failures
Sinдle IC 0 0 0
k = t t − 1 0 n − 1
k < t k − 1 t − k (t − k) ∗ n
Table 1: Number of malicious/faulty ICs that different
setups can tolerate in each abnormal scenario. The system
is assumed to feature n identical quorums of size t , with a
secret-sharing threshold k .
and were also empirically verified using our prototype introduced
in Section 5.
In practice, the threshold k and the size of the quorums t express
the trade-off between confidentiality and robustness for each par-
ticular quorum. The relationship between these two parameters
determines how many ICs can cease to function, before the quorum
fails: When k equals the number of processing ICs t , then secrets
are safe in the presence of t − 1 compromised and colluding ICs.
On the other hand, a more “relaxed” threshold (k < t ) enables the
quorum to remain fully functional unless more than t − k ICs fail
(maliciously or through wear). Alternatively, (k = t )-systems can
withstand multiple ICs failing (due to wear) using the technique
introduced in Section 4.6. This technique enables several quorums
to handle requests for the same public key, and thus even if mul-
tiple ICs (and consequently the quorums they belong to) fail, the
remaining quorums can still handle incoming requests for those
public keys. It should be noted that this technique provides robust-
ness only in the presence of faulty & defective ICs, but does not
mitigate denial of service attacks. This is because, all n quorums
are identical (same manufacturer diversity) and thus a malicious
IC from a breached supply chain will participate in all quorums.
In contrast, defective ICs will fail with a probability less than 1
(post-fabrication tests detect always failing ICs) and thus several
quorums will remain functional.
From all the above, the security guarantees offered by Myst are
determined by the threshold k , the IC diversity and the number of
quorums. In our prototype, we chose to maximize confidentiality,
and resist the presence of t − 1 actively malicious ICs. Malicious ICs
launching denial-of-service attacks are easier to detect and replace,
compared to those subtly leaking secrets or weakening keys. In
cases where increased robustness and availability are paramount,
the security level can be adjusted in favor of redundancy using the
appropriate threshold schemes [62].
6.4 Other Considerations
In this section, we consider several qualitative properties commonly
used in the industry.
Physical Security & Diversity. SmartCards forms the core of
our prototype and have multiple benefits as they were designed
to operate in a hostile environment that is assumed to be fully
controlled by the adversary [68]. For this reason, they come with
very-high tamper-resistance (FIPS140-2, Level 4) and secure stor-
age capabilities, that are constantly evolving. Another benefit is
that there are several manufacturers owning foundries including
NXP-semiconductors, ST Microelectronics, Samsung, Infineon and
Athena. Moreover, there are numerous independent facilities used
by different vendors to fabricate their ICs [29, 72, 78, 83], which
also contributes to the necessary diversity for the quorums.
Code & Parameter Provisioning. Crucial component of the se-
curity of Myst. If the code on all the ICs, or the cryptographic
parameters contain errors, then the security of the system is not
guaranteed. We propose two strategies to ensure secure provision-
ing. First, we may assume that provisioning occurs at the factory.
This leverages our assumption that some of the factories are hon-
est, and ensures that an adversary would have to compromise all
fabrication facilities to extract any secrets. The second strategy is
to assume the existence of a trusted off-line provisioning facility
that is not under the control of an adversary. This facility needs
only to guarantee high-integrity, as no secrets are involved in the
provisioning step (secrets are generated within the ICs as part of
protocols executed later).
Formal Security Validations. Any off-premise use of ICs raises
a question of trust. To address this problem, independent security
validations (e.g., FIPS140-2, or Common Criteria) have been intro-
duced. These validations are performed by a third party, which
verifies the claims of hardware vendors. However, these validations
are a serious bottleneck when introducing new IC design. Myst
does not need to go through this process as it executes provably
secure cryptographic schemes on already validated ICs. As a result,
even if one of the ICs has passed an independent validation, the
whole instance of the Myst carries this assurance.
Real-world Practicality.Myst provides a platform for generating
legally binding digital signatures (eIDAS [28]) under the sole con-
trol of the user. Moreover, due to the tamper-resistance properties
of SmartCards, ICs can be also stored remotely thus making Myst a
highly practical system that is able to support some non-typical real-
world use-cases. For instance, Myst can perform code-signing of
mobile applications for apps stores (e.g., AppStore or Google Play),
by sharing the signing keys between developers’ laptops, managers’
computers, and securely stored ICs providing protection against
internal enterprise/company attackers without compromising de-
velopers’ control over the signing process. Finally, another practical
feature of Myst is that each party maintains its own independent
audit logs, thus ensuring non-repudiation.
7 RELATEDWORK
This section examines existing literature on hardware trojans and
countermeasures, outlines relevant fault-tolerant designs and ar-
chitectures, and discusses how Myst compares to prior works.
Hardware Trojans & Countermeasures. To better understand
the extend of the Hardware Trojans threat, numerous attacks and ex-
ploitation techniques have been proposed in the literature in the last
decade. For instance, the authors in [51] design two hardware tro-
jans and implement a proof-of-concept attack against the PRINCE
cipher [22]. The novelty of their attacks is that they use dopant
polarity changes (first introduced in [10]), to create a hard-to-detect
fault-injection attack backdoor. Moreover, [63] also introduces a
hardware trojan attacking RSA applications. In this attack, the ad-
versary is able to use power supply fluctuations to trigger the trojan,
which then leaks bits of the key through a signature. Another very
hard to detect class of trojans (inserted by fabrication-time attack-
ers) was introduced by K Yang et al. in [96]. Such trojans leverage
analog circuits and require only a single logic gate to launch their
attack (e.g., switch the CPU’s mode). Apart from these, detection
evasion and stealthy triggering techniques have been proposed
in [17, 52, 89–91].
As discussed in Section 1, malicious components carrying errors
have been also observed in commercial and military hardware [2,
38, 48, 54, 57, 74–76], while a subset of those incidents also involved
misbehaving cryptographic hardware [41, 43, 69, 70]. In all these
cases, the errors were eventually attributed to honest design or
fabrication mistakes, but the systems were left vulnerable to attacks
regardless. For instance, one popular and well-studied example
of attacks against weak cryptographic hardware is [15]. In this
work, Bernstein et al. study the random number generators used in
smartcards and found various malfunctioning pieces, that allowed
them to break 184 public keys using in “Citizen Digital Certificates”
by Taiwanese citizens.
To address the aforementioned threats, different approaches have
been proposed. The most common ones attempt to either detect ma-
licious circuitry, or prevent insertions. In particular, detection tech-
niques aim to determine whether any HTs exist in a given circuit
and feature a wide range of methods such as side-channel analysis
[3, 77, 93, 95], logic testing [25], and trust verification [7, 66, 88, 100].
On the other hand, prevention techniques aim to either impede the
introduction of HTs, or make HT easier to detect, such approaches
are Split manufacturing [27, 67, 92] which tries to minimize the
circuit/design exposure to the adversary, logic obfuscation [24] and
runtime monitoring [45, 86]
Moreover, there is also a smaller body of work which attempts
to tackle the even harder problem of inferring additional informa-
tion about the HT such as its triggers, payload, and exact loca-
tion [93, 95]. On top of the above works, there are also verifiable
computation architecures (such as [85]), which provide guaran-
tees for the correctness of the computation on untrusted platforms.
However, they come with a computation overhead and do not guar-
antee secure handling of secrets or protection from side-channel
attacks.
Myst follows an alternative approach that leverages a diverse set
of untrusted ICs tominimize the risk of compromises by distributing
trust between them. For this reason, all the above countermeasures
remain applicable and would even increase the security of the
final system. In other words, our proposed approach is not an
alternative to existing techniques, as it provides a way to combine
ICs fabricated by different manufacturers, in various locations and
featuring a wide-range of protection techniques in one system.
Fault-Tolerant Systems. Component-redundancy and
component-diversification are both key concepts used in N-
variant systems that aim to achieve high fault-tolerance [26]. An
example of such a system is the Triple-Triple Redundant 777 Pri-
mary Flight Computer [98, 99], that replicates the computations in
three processors and then performs a majority voting to determine
the final result. The applications of N-variance in security scenarios
has been studied in only few works aiming to protect systems
against software attacks. In particular, [31] introduces a method
to generate randomized system copies, that will have disjoint
exploitation sets, thus achieving memory safety. On the other hand,
[4] proposes a N-variant method for IC diversification, aiming
again to achieve disjoint exploitation sets. However, this method
is not effective against fabrication-time attacks and protects only
against (potentially exploitable) unintentional errors. Finally,
heterogeneous architectures with COTS components have been
also proposed in [8, 9]. However, the practicality of these works is
very limited as the computations are simply replicated between the
different components, thus not protecting against confidentiality
attacks.
8 CONCLUSION
High-assurance cryptographic hardware, such as hardware secu-
rity modules, is used in production under the assumption that its
individual components are secure and free from errors. However,
even though post-fabrication testing is capable of detecting defec-
tive ICs with high-accuracy, there are certain error classes that are
hard to uncover (e.g., RNG defects). Unfortunately, these errors are
also detrimental to the security of high-assurance hardware such
as hardware security modules. Moreover, hardware trojans and
malicious circuitry have been extensively studied, and there is an
abundance of designs, mitigation techniques and countermeasure
evasion methods. This line of work assumes that not all errors can
be detected and that due to the arms race, between trojan horses
and mitigation techniques, countermeasures will never be 100%
effective against all possible threats.
To resolve this, we introduce Myst, which brings the adversary
into the unfavorable position of having to compromise 100% of the
hardware components to gain any advantage. By employing thresh-
old schemes and a redundancy-based architecture, Myst is able
to distribute both secrets and cryptographic computations among
multiple, diverse integrated circuits. Consequently, an adversary
aiming to breach the confidentiality or the integrity of the system,
must be able to compromise all the ICs. This is not a trivial task
when the ICs are manufactured from different vendors, in different
premises. To evaluate Myst, we build a custom board featuring
120 Smart Cards controlled by an Artix-7 FPGA. The maximum
throughput for distributed decryption is 315ops/sec, while for sign-
ing is 77ops/sec. Both come with an overhead of less than < 1%
compared to a typical single-point of failure system. All in all, our
results show that Myst is highly scalable, and provides strong guar-
antees for the security of the system thus making it suitable for
production.
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A MULTI-SIGNATURE SCHEME PROOF
In this Appendix we discuss the security of our construction intro-
duced in Section 4.5. Before moving to the proof of the Theorem 4.1
we recall the definition of the one-more discrete logarithm problem
[12] and security definitions for multi-signatures schemes.
Definition A.1 (N -DL). A group generatorG(1λ) is a probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm that on input a security parameter λ
returns a pair (p,G) where p is a λ-bit prime and G is a random
generator of a cyclic group G of order p.
An algorithm A to solve the N -DL problem is a probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm which receives as input an instance
(p,G) ← G(1λ) and can access two oracle Och ,Odloд . Upon re-
quest, the former returns a random group element in G. The lat-
ter gets as input a group element C and returns its discrete loga-
rithm with respect to the generator G, i.e. such that C = x ·G. Let
C1,C2, . . . ,CN be the challenges returned by Och . We say that ad-
versaryA wins if he returns c1, . . . , cN ∈ Zp satisfyingCi = ci ·G
by using a number of queries to Odloд strictly smaller than N .
Next, we recall definitions of multi-signatures of [13], adapted
to our settings.
Definition A.2 (Multi-Signature). A multi-signature scheme is a
tuple (KeyGen, Siдn,Veri f y) of algorithms.
❖ KeyGen: This is an interactive protocol between n parties
ICi to jointly compute a common shared verification key Y
and n individual signing keys xi associated with Y .
❖ Siдn: This is an interactive protocol between the n ICs that
given input a common messagem and their individual secret
keys xi allows to compute a shared signature Σ onm.
❖ Veri f y: This is a deterministic algorithm that given in input
the common verification key Y , a signature Σ and a message
m returns 1 if the signature is valid and 0 otherwise.
In the construction presented in Section 4.5 the key generation
protocol is handled by the DKPG; Siдn is described by Algorithm 4.7
and Figures 4 and 5; Veri f y consists of the verification algorithm
of standard Schnorr signatures on the aggregated signature using
the shared verification key Y .
Definition A.3 (Security Game). We consider and adversary F
attempting to forge a multi-signature. The attack is modelled as a
game in three phases.
❖ Setup: We assume the key generation protocol among n
parties to be successfully executed and returning a shared
public key Y and a set of n secret keys xi .
❖ Attack: We assume the forger F to corrupt n − 1 ICs and
learn their own individual secret keys xi . Without loss of
generality, we assume user IC1 to be the only honest user
in the system. The forger F interacts as the host over qS
interactive signing sessions with IC1 and arbitrarily deciding
on the messages to be signed. LetQ to be the set of messages
m used in the interactive signing sessions.
❖ Forgery: At the end of its execution, the forger F returns a
signature Σ on a messagem which was not used on a signing
session with IC1, namely m < Q . The forger F wins the
game if Veri f y(Y ,m, Σ) = 1.
We model the security of the scheme in the random oracle
model [14, 35]. This means that we assume the hash function to
behave as an ideal random function. This is modelled by giving
to the adversary F access to an oracle OHash returning random
values in a range {0, 1}λ .
The advantage advms (F ) of algorithm F in forging a multi-
signature is defined to be the probability that F wins the above
game, where the probability is taken over the random coins of F ,
IC1, DKGP and the random oracle. We say that F (qS ,qH , ϵ)-breaks
the multi-signature scheme if it participates in qS signing sessions
with IC1, makes at most qH queries to OHash and the advantage
advms (F ) ≥ ϵ .
We now restate and prove Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1. If there exists a (qS ,qH , ϵ)-forger F for the multi-
signature scheme described in Figures 4 and 5 interacting inqS = O(1)
signature queries, making at most qH Hash queries and succeeding
with probability ϵ , then there exists an algorithm A that solves the
(qS + 1)-DL problem with probability at least
δ ≥ ϵ
2
q
qS+1
H
− neдl(λ)
Proof. We start by describing the idea behind the reduction.
Assume for a moment that a forger F is able to produce two valid
signatures (σ , ϵ) and (σ ′, ϵ ′) on the same message, i.e.
ϵ = Hash(σ ·G +ϵ ·Y | |H (m)| |j) ϵ ′ = Hash(σ ′ ·G +ϵ ′ ·Y | |m | |j)
(2)
and such that
R = σ ·G + ϵ R = σ ′ ·G + ϵ ′ · Y (3)
Dividing the two equations we obtain
(σ − σ ′) ·G = (ϵ ′ − ϵ) · Y
then we get the discrete logarithm of Y with respect toG by com-
puting (σ − σ ′) ∗ (ϵ ′ − ϵ)−1 mod p.
Given a forger F to output forged signatures, we construct an
adversary A for solving the (qS + 1)-DL problem. In the process,
A has to simulate signatures as produced by IC1 and answer to the
random oracle queries made by F during the attack, as it happen
in the security game for multi-signatures. In case F succeeds in
forging a first signature, then adversary A rewinds F and replay
him reusing the same coin tosses used in the first execution. How-
ever in the second run of F , the adversary replaces the answer of
the random oracle query corresponding to the forgery produced
in the first execution with a fresh random string in the range of
the hash function. By applying a forking lemma type of argument
[64] one can then argue that with good probability the replay of
F will return a new forgery which has the same R as in the first
forged signature but different (σ ′, ϵ ′). Once adversary A obtains
two signatures of this kind, he will be able to compute the discrete
logarithm of Y as shown above3.
The description ofA is given in Algorithm A.1. Throughout the
execution, adversary A keeps track of the random oracle queries
made by F using a list L[·]. Without loss of generality we assume
3The adversary described in the proof actually has to computes the discrete logarithm
of Y1 , the public key of IC1 . This is trivial to do once the adversary A has obtained
the discrete logarithm of Y , the shared verification key.
the adversary F checks all the signature queries made to her oracle,
as well as the signature he attempts to forge.
We can summarise the interaction of adversaryA with F in the
following phases.
❖ Setup Phase:A initialises an empty list L. She picks a random
string ρ for the randomness used by adversary F as well as
qH random values πi from the range of the hash function,
hereby set to be {0, 1}λ . The adversary then simulates the
multi-signature key generation process: she generates pairs
of public and secret keys for the corrupted cards IC2, . . . , ICn ,
as honest cards would do, and generates the public key of IC1
by querying his own challenge oracle Y1 ← Och . Finally, she
generates the shared public key Y as in the key generation
protocol (Algorithm 4.3). Then she starts adversary F on
inputs the shared verification key Y , the list of verification
key-shares and the n − 1 signing key corresponding to the
corrupted ICs.
❖ Caching Phase: the adversary F , acting as the hosts, initiates
the signature process by sending Init to IC1. In this phase
the adversary emulates the caching phase of IC1 by making
qS queris to Och and returning the list of group elements to
F .
❖ Random Oracle Queries: whenever F makes a new query
(Hash,M) to its random oracle, adversary A answers it by
picking the next unused random string in {π1,π2, . . . ,πqH }.
She keeps track of F requests to answer consistently.
❖ Signing Queries: in this phase the forger submits signature
queries as the host in the system. The adversary A hashes
the message, consistently with the list of random oracle
queries and uses her oracle Odloд to compute the requested
signature.
❖ Replay: F eventually attempts to output a forged multi-
signature (σ , ϵ). If the signatures verifies, A rewinds adver-
sary F to the beginning and replay it on input the same
random coins ρ and same inputs and reusing the same re-
sponse in the caching phase. A answers the random oracle
and signing queries as in the first execution apart form the
random oracle query which generated ϵ . A answers this
query by picking a random string π ′i ∈ {0, 1}λ . The forger
attempts to produce a new signature (σ ′, ϵ ′). If conditions
(2) and (3) are met, then A computes the discrete logarithm
of Y , and thus the discrete logarithm of Y1. Given the latter
and the responses ofOdloд she can also compute the discrete
logarithm of the R1, j , the outputs of Och .
In order to succeed in her game, adversaryA has to simulate the
interaction between F and IC1 as described in the security game
of multi-signatures. The above adversary perfectly simulates the
multi-signature key generation phase, the caching phase of IC1 and
the random oracle queries of F . Extra care needs to be taken for
signature queries simulating the interaction of IC1 and F .
Simulation of Signature Queries. Note that differently from
standard Schnorr signatures, we cannot simulate a signature by
programming the random oracle. This is because the caching phase
of IC1 fixes the randomness used in the signatures beforeA knows
the messages corresponding to them, preventing him to program
the random oracle accordingly. Thus, in order to simulate IC1’s
Algorithm A.1: Adversary AOch,OdloдF against (qS + 1)-DL
Input : (p,G).
Output :qS + 1 discrete logarithms using qS calls to Odloд
1 Setup Phase
2 ctr = 0, j = 1
3 Set L[·] = ∅, J [·] = ∅
4 Set random string ρ for adversary F .
5 Pick π1,π2, . . . ,πqH ← {0, 1}λ
6 Y1 ← Och
7 for i = 2 to n do
8 xi ← Zp
9 Yi = xi ·G ← Och
10 Y =
∑n
i=1 Yi
11 Start F (Y , (Y1, . . . ,Yn ), (x2, . . . ,xn ); ρ)
12 Caching Phase: Init ← F
13 R1,1,R1,2, . . . ,R1,qS ← Och
14 Run F (R1,1,R1,2, . . . ,R1,qS )
15 Random Oracle Queries: (Hash,M) ← F
16 if L[M] = ⊥ then
17 ctr+ = 1
18 L[M] = ctr
19 k = L[M]
20 Run F (πk)
21 Signing Queries: (Siдn, (R,H (m), j ′)) ← F
22 if j ′ , j then
23 return ⊥ to F
24 else
25 j+ = 1
26 if L[R | |H (m)| |j ′] = ⊥ then
27 ctr+ = 1
28 L[R | |H (m)| |j ′] = ctr
29 k = L[[R | |H (m)| |j ′]]
30 J [j ′] = k
31 ϵj′ = πk
32 σj′ ← Odloд(R1, j′ − h · Y )
33 Run F ((σj′ , ϵj′))
34 (Forдery, (m, (σ ,πi ))) ← F
35 if Veri f y(Y ,m, (σ ,πi )) = 0 then
36 return ⊥
37 Replay F
38 (Forдery, (m, (σ ′,π ′i ))) ← F
39 if Veri f y(Y ,m, (σ ′,π ′i )) = 0 then
40 return ⊥
41 x1 = (σ − σ ′) ∗ (πi ′ − πi )−1 −∑nj=2 x j mod p
42 for j = 1 to qS do
43 k = J [j]
44 r1, j = sj + x1 ∗ πk mod p
45 return (x1, r1,1, . . . , r1,qS )
signatures A takes advantage of her Odloд oracle. As A has to
make fewer queries toOdloд than toOch , she is allowed one call to
the discrete logarithm oracle for each signature in the first round.
The problem arises when A replays the forger F . In this execu-
tion we want F to behave exactly as in the first round up to the
point he queries (a second time) the random oracle on the forged
message. This means that in the caching phaseA is forced to reuse
the same random group elements as in the first execution. Since
A cannot make new queries to the challenge oracle, she cannot
make any more queries to the Odloд during the second execution
of F . Therefore, in the second execution, A has to simulate signa-
tures (on potentially different messages) without the help of her
oracle. Assume for a moment that the index of hash queries used
for the creation of signatures is the same in both executions. In this
case, the response of the random oracle on the corresponding hash
queries will be the same, even if the message has changed during
the two execution. Since the the output of the hash is the same
in both runs, A is able to answer the signature queries by simply
recycling the signature produced in the first execution.
Computation of Discrete Logarithm. Under the condition that
A simulates F ’s environment, the above adversary succeeds to
extract the discrete logarithm of Y1 as long as the index of the
hash query associated to the forged signatures is the same in both
runs. In this case conditions (2) and (3) are met with overwhelming
probability and A can proceed to compute discrete logarithm as
illustrated above.
From the above observations we can summarise two conditions
which make adversary A to succeeds in her game:
(1) The index i of the random oracle query corresponding to the
forged signature is the same in both executions of F .
(2) The set J of indexes of random oracle queries corresponding
to signature queries is the same in both execution of F .
By assuming that F forges signatures with non-negligible prob-
ability ϵ , the following lemma shows the above conditions holds
with non-negligible probability. This concludes the proof as it gives
a bound δ , the probability of success of A. 
The following lemma is an adaptation of the generalized forking
lemma of [13] and Lemma 5 of [59].
Lemma A.4. Let F be an adversary producing a multi-signature
forgery with probability ϵ . Assuming that F makes at most qH hash
queries and interacts in qS = O(1) signatures, then by replaying F ,
A succeeds with probability δ ≥ ϵ 2
qqS +1H
− neдl(λ).
Proof. Let i ∈ [qH ] be the index of the random oracle query
associated to the forgery returned by F and let J ⊆ [qH ], |J | ≤ qS
be the set of indexes of oracle queries associated with the signatures
queries made by F . Call i and J the target indexes. Note that J and
{i} are disjoint as a valid forgery cannot be on a message queried
on the signature oracle.
For any fixed i, J let ϵi, J be the probability that F produces
a forgery on target indexes i, J . The probability of F forging a
signature is given by ϵ =
∑
i, J ϵi, J .
Consider now all the random inputs given to F . These includes
the random coins ρ, his inputs, the response of the caching phase,
the responses of the random oracle queries and the signature
queries. We split these into: the i-th response to the random oracle
query, πi , and everything else, which we call R. Consider now a
matrixMi, J with one column for every possible answer to πi and
one row for any possible string R. The entries of the matrix are 1,
in case R and πi will make F produce a forgery for target indexes
i, J , and 0 otherwise. For any i, J , let ϵi, J ,R be the probability of the
adversary F to produce a forgery given randomness R. This cor-
responds to the density of the row R in the matrixMi, J . Similarly,
ϵi, J corresponds to the density of the matrixMi, J , namely
ϵi, J =
1
|R |
∑
R
ϵi, J ,R
In a similar fashion we define δi, J to be the probability of pro-
ducing two forgeries on the same target indexes i, J while replaying
the adversary on same randomness and replacing πi with a random
π ′i ← {0, 1}λ . Similarly, we also define δi, J ,R for which we have
δi, J =
1
R
∑
R
δi, J ,R
We now relate probability δ of adversaryA to F . The probability
δi, J ,R corresponds to the event of sampling randomness R for the
adversary F , hitting a first 1 in the row R ofMi, J and then probe
another random column in the same row and hitting another 1.
Since the two runs are independent, the probability of succeeding
in the replay attack is
δi, J ,R = ϵi, J ,R ∗
(
ϵi, J ,R − 12λ
)
Replacing the above in the expression of δi, J and applying the
Cauchy-Schwartz inequality give the following
δi, J =
1
|R |
∑
R
δi, J ,R
=
1
|R |
(∑
R
ϵ2i, J ,R −
ϵi, J ,R
2λ
)
≥
(
1
|R |
∑
R
ϵi, J ,R
)2
− ϵi, J
2λ
= ϵ2i, J −
ϵi, J
2λ
Given the above we get the following bound on δ
δ =
∑
i, J
δi, J ≥
∑
i, J
(
ϵ2i, J −
ϵi, J
2λ
)
=
∑
i, J
ϵ2i, J −
ϵ
2λ
≥ 1
q
qS+1
H
©­«
∑
i, J
ϵi, J
ª®¬
2
− ϵ
2λ
=
ϵ2
q
qS+1
H
− ϵ
2λ
where the last inequality is obtained by applying again the Cauchy-
Schwartz inequality. 
B PROTOTYPE EXTENSIONS
Our Myst prototype can also be extended to use multiple ICs boards,
if higher throughput is needed. Figure 11 depicts an instantiation
with 240 ICs: two boards holding 120 ICs each (60 ICs on each
side) and an Artix-7 FPGA to facilitate the inter-IC communication
within each board.
Figure 11:Myst’s prototypewith 240 JavaCards fitted into an
1U rack case.
